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There is an apparent paradox at the core of the study of neoliberalism. Although a growing research 
literature in recent decades have documented how neoliberal ideas about free markets and 
privatization has been increasingly dominant in universities, government agencies and international 
organizations, this neoliberal dominance have not in meant any meaningful sense meant rollback of 
state power.  
Among the more sophisticated works of the neoliberalism, we have seen an analysis stating that the  
goal of neoliberalism is not a simple realization of minimal state in which state power is rolled back in 
favour of market forces. Instead, researchers such as Michel Foucault, Philip Mirowski and Jamie Peck 
see neoliberalism as a project that is aiming towards a redefinition of the relationship between state 
and market. The goal is not only to deregulate, but also to use state  power to actively reshape the 
economy.  
This nuanced understanding of the relationship between state and market in neoliberalism, however 
is often made by contrasting it with a distorted version of the classic liberalism of the nineteenth 
century 1, which is being portrayed as a simple realization of the principle of laissez-faire2 and the 
minimal state. This idea of a sharp contrast between neoliberalism and classical laissez-faire liberalism 
can be traced back to the early neoliberal such as Hayek,  who in the period after the Great Depression 
formulated neoliberalism, as a stated contrast to what they perceived as the dogmatism and simplicity 
                                                             
1 Liberalism purposes for the purposes of this article, us delimited as the self-identifying political liberal 
movement in line with Fawcett, (2015). "Liberals" from the period before the term was first used in Spain from 
the 18010s are therefore only touched upon sporadically 
2 The term laissez-faire originated from the physiocratic school in 1700s France (Viner, 1960), but in this article 
will be used to denote the period of the doctrines dominance within liberal economic thinking in the first part of 
the nineteenth century. 
of classic laissez-faire liberalism. . This sharp contrast between classical laissez-faire liberalism and 
neoliberalism, which Hayek and the early Mt Pelerin Society developed in a special conjuncture in the 
1930s and 40s, has since been taken as gospel fora great number of studies, beginning with Foucault's 
analyses of neoliberalism in the late 1970s. 
This picture is far from accurate, however. Laissez-faire liberalism economic hegemony in the 1800s 
was not characterized by consensus on a naive rollback of state power. Instead, there existed a wide 
range of theoretical positions in relation to the state's role in the economy. In political practice the 
period also saw economic liberals employ an imaginative and active use of state power means to 
promote the project of laissez-faire. Furthermore, later neoliberals as Milton Friedman and his 
followers in the Chicago school, who came to influence the next generation of the Mont Pelerin Society, 
also set out a vision of the state, which is much closer to the classic notion of laissez-faire, than the 
writings of Hayek in the 1940s.  
As such the flexible and active use of the state to promote the goal of market regulation is not a specific 
ideological innovation by neoliberalism, but rather something that can also be found in the classic 
laissez-faire liberalism. In the neoliberal thinking we see well enough a greater theoretical attention on 
the role of the state, than are found among 1800's laissez-faire liberals. But as we will see below, this is 
rather an expression and explication of an underexposed area within liberal economic thinking than 
any sort of break or innovation.  
The article will attempt to clarify the question by a review of the hegemonic period of classical 
liberalism in  Britain to show how various characters from the early political economy formulated a 
view of the state's economic role that is far more nuanced than simple laissez-faire. Then the article 
will show how laissez-faire thinking is also present in the neoliberal movement, while the final section 
will to use Polanyi's analysis in The Great Transformation, as a starting point for a more adequate 
understanding of the relationship between state power, capitalist practice and economic theory. 
 
1. In the shadow of Foucault 
Few works have had greater impact on the research in neoliberalism more than Foucault's treatment 
of the subject in his lectures on The Birth Biopolitics at the College de France in 1978-79 (Foucault, 
2008). In these Foucault presents the idea that neoliberalism must be analyzed as a distinct, new 
theory complex, which is radically different from the classical economic liberalism that triumphed in 
the 1800s. He states that “Neoliberalism should not (..) be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with 
permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention. This is very clear in most of the neo-liberal texts” 
(Foucault 2008, 132). Foucault describes a turn towards a more positive view of the state in the 
neoliberal movement, especially among Hayek and former ordoliberale as Walter Eucken and Wilhelm 
Röpke, who in 1930 and 40s launched their economic thinking as a contrast to the classical idea of 
laissez-faire. The goal was not to minimize the size of the state, but rather to reshape its institutions 
and use state power to spread market regulation to new parts of society: 
The problem of neo-liberalism was not how to cut out or contrive a free space of the market within an 
already given political society, as in the liberalism of Adam Smith and the eighteenth century. The 
problem of neo-liberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modelled on the 
principles of a market economy. (Foucault 2008, 131). According to Foucault, the ultimate objective of 
the neoliberals were not to free market forces through a rollback of the state. Instead the aim was to 
develop a new governance of the self, which allowed the tools and techniques of the market to be 
spread to more and more areas of life. In this way the economics of individual competition and 
rationality of the market provided a normative model for society,. . This development culminated with 
Gary Becker of the Chicago school, who with his  Economics  Imperialism used the neoclassical 
methodology to model and describe all forms of human behaviour from marriage preferences to the 
prevalence crime. 
Foucault was the first theorist to advance this idea of a sharp difference between new and classical 
liberalism, when it comes to the state. But he is not the only, to draw inspiration from the writings on 
Hayek and to ordoliberal. Important contemporary analysts of neoliberal theory as Jamie Peck (Peck, 
2010) Philip Mirowski (Mirowski, 2013; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) have a similar take. It is no 
coincidence that this The idea of neoliberalism not only aim to roll back the state, but rather to 
transform and use the state, has been used as a counterweight to simplistic descriptions of the 
neoliberal project as a one-eyed attempt to roll the welfare state back or a simple market 
fundamentalist ideology, based on blind faith in market forces (see Giddens, 1999; Krugman, 2009; 
Stiglitz, 2009). This view became more popular after the millennium, as it began to be clear that the 
neoliberal wave of reforms since 1980 had not led to any significant reduction in government size, 
even in liberal core countries like England, Australia and USA (Cahill, 2014 ). 
But there are also problems in this approach to neoliberalism. There is a danger of uncritically taking 
over an assumption of a dogmatic classical laissez-faire that were painted early neoliberal as Hayek for 
polemical reasons. A nuanced understanding of neoliberalism is thus provided, by contrasting it with a 
very un-nuanced image of classical laissez-faire liberalism,. This classic liberalism is portrayed as 
everything neoliberalism is not: Dogmatically hostile to government regulation, keen on a simple 
minimization of state power, and with no understanding of the active role of the state in constructing 
opportunities for new markets. Peck describes eg. How the “fundamental error in the foundations of 
19th century liberalism [was that it] gave the state hardly any other task other than to maintain peace, 
and to foresee that contracts were kept. It was a naive ideology.” (Peck, 2010, 3).  
Mirowski similarly discloses how " the dichotomies and rigidities that characterized classical 
liberalism with regard to its proposed firewalls between economics and politics" and how 
neoliberalism in contrast, must be “, neoliberalism has to be understood as a flexible and pragmatic 
response to the previous crisis of capitalism”  (Mirowski, 2013, 55). He also stresses that "The starting 
point of neoliberalism is the admission, contrary to classical liberal doctrine, that their vision of the 
good society will triumph only if it becomes reconciled to the fact that the conditions for its existence 
must be constructed, and will not come about “naturally” in the absence of concerted political effort 
and organization.” (Mirowski, 2013, 61). In this way, it paints a picture of classical liberalism where 
laissez-faire was not just an ideological guideline, but also the actual executed policy. This image helps 
to highlight the neoliberal doctrine’s distinct breakthroughs. The problem however, is that the image 
thus drawn on classical laissez-faire liberalism is both simplistic and wrong. 
 
2. the nuances of Laissez-faire  
The classic laissez-faire liberalism is particularly linked to nineteenth century Britain. Although there 
have been precursors among Enlightenment free-trade advocates such as Adam Smith and Bernard de 
Mandeville, it was in the period after the Napoleonic Wars that a genuine liberal political identity 
emerged (Fawcett, 2015). In Britain in the decades after 1820 a liberal movement with advocates such 
as Ricardo, Richard Cobden and Jeremy Bentham succeeded in implementing a political agenda of free 
trade, the rule of law and protection of private property. Among the important political results were 
poor law reform in 1836 and the dismantling of protectionist grain laws in 1846 (Hobsbawm, 2003). 
With their radical economic program centered around the market and free trade, the nineteenth 
century laissez-faire movements distinguished itself markedly from the more socially oriented 
orientation that came to dominate most liberal parties during the first half of twentieth century 
(Freeden, 1986 ). But their radical economic ambitions did not mean that the relationship with the 
state was unison or naive. Both when regards to theory and political practice, classical laissez-faire 
liberalism contained far more diverse and nuanced view of the role of government than assumed by 
Hayek and the ordoliberals. 
In the intellectual sphere nineteenth century laissez-faire liberalism contained both supporters of a 
minimal state, such as the Manchester School of  Richard Cobden and John Bright, as well as liberals 
who had a much more positive view government intervention - eg. in the utilitarian tradition of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In Principles of Political Economy JS Mill in 1848 described the how the 
state's role in the liberal community was not only to maintain peace and order, but also to assume a 
variety of substantial economic roles. This included areas such as poor relief, education, the 
establishment of colonies and in special cases where the market could  not solve it, the construction of 
"roads, docks, harbours, canals, irrigation systems, hospitals, schools, universities, printing presses 
(Mill, 1848 , 54). " The economy historian of economic thought  Roger Backhouse describes how the 
majority of the period's politically active economists, including Ricardo, were organized in the Political 
Economy Club, founded in 1821. These were supporters of free trade and opponents of government 
regulation, but had " a pragmatic outlook [on the role of the state] in which the role for laissez-faire 
was severely circumscribed" (Backhouse, 2002, 150). 
When it came to political practice classical liberalism characterized where not charactherised by a 
unilateral laissez-faire either. On the central question of the organization and disciplining of labour, 
both state and private power played a key role . The creation of a free market economy depended on 
the access to free but obedient workers, who willingly sold their labour for fair But his was a creature 
that existed naturally, but rather one that had to be created. The process of commodification of labour 
was not an automatic historical development. Nineteenth century economic liberals understood that in 
order to create a genuine market for labour,  they had to remove other substantive options than 
participation in the labour market. Here legislation and state power an played active and decisive role. 
The main barrier to the realization of the desired labour market was the English poor laws (Blaug, 
1964). As long as the workers could receive support from the parish, the early liberals saw it as 
impossible to get the  necessary amount of workers to offer their labour for sale. The English Poor Law 
system, which was based on a social benefits financed by the local parish, had its roots to the Tudor 
era, but was enhanced  considerably by humanitarian reformers in the late 1700s (Cowherd, 1977, 
14). 
These welfare reforms were met with fierce resistance. At firs this resistance was driven primarily  by 
a moralistic criticism, with Thomas Malthus as a leading figure,  where it was seen as a moral 
imperative that the poor were subjected to hard work. It was not until the next wave of opponents 
however, that the criticism of poor laws were effectively organized. This group, whose work 
culminated in the major poor law reform in 1834, with Jeremy Bentham as a central figure and 
consisted primarily of economic liberals who supported the project of laissez faire. (Cowherd, 1977, 
82). Bentham's opposition to the existing poor laws were based on utilitarianism and his belief in the 
free market. He believed that wealth came from the freedom to the investment of capital and that such 
freedom demanded the complete commodification of labour (Bentham, 2001). In order to create the 
social situation which made possible a real labour market, ie the absence of other subsistence options 
than participation in labour for wages, it was necessary to actively use legislation and state power to 
remove the protective institutions and norms that stood in the way of this development. Bentham, 
formulated in 1801, his relationship to state power as follows: 
 
I have not, and never had, nor ever shall have any horror, sentimental or 
anarchical, the hand of government. I leave it to Adam Smith and champions of 
the rights of man (...) to talk of invasion of the natural liberty, and to give as a 
special argument against this or that law, an argument which would be to 
negative upon all laws (quoted from Hutchison, 2002, 37) . 
 
The liberal reformers triumphed with poor law reform in 1834, which sharply reduced the poor relief. 
Eric Hobsbawm emphasizes that "the Poor law of 1834 was designed to make life so intolerable for the 
rural paupers as to force them to migrate to any job that was offered" (Hobsbawm, 2003, 188). For the 
radical liberals behind the reform, this was not a problem, but the target itself. The threat of 
unemployment and hunger as a motivating and disciplining factor that could be used to achieve a 
controllable workforce, without the use of direct coercion or violence as during the feudal system. This 
sentiment is even expressed by John Stuart Mill, who in Principles of Political Economy states that 
public assistance makes impossible any form of civilized management, because without the power to 
dismiss it was only possible "to extract real work from day laborers using the whip's power" (Mill, 
1848 263) 
When you look at the 1800s economic liberals, it is important not only to recognize the doctrinal 
differences, but also to distinguish between self-representation and political practice. On the one hand, 
almost everyone in the period were nominal supporters of letting the self-regulating market forces 
rein, on the other hand, the vast majority were also open to the use of state power and legislation to 
remove barriers to commodification, and saw the need for expanding state power over the individuals 
when it came to disciplining labour. 
3: Differences within neoliberalism 
The thesis of the fundamental difference between classical laissez-faire and neoliberalism is not 
problematic because of a simplistic understanding of the classical liberalism, but also of a one-sided  
understanding of neoliberalism. If we look at the neoliberal movement through its history, it is difficult 
to see a completely unambiguous rejection of laissez-faire or a markedly more positive view of the 
state than in the classical liberalism.When the early neoliberalism was formulated in the interwar 
period, it was during a period with growing power of governments, who with financial planning and 
fiscal policy were able to intervene much more forcefully economy than had been the case previously. 
At the same time the Great Depression that followed the stock market crash in 1929, had shaken the 
faith in the market's self-regulating abilities among the public. 
It was in this atmosphere that Hayek and the ordoliberals saw a rhetorical and political necessity in 
distancing themselves from a perceived discredited ideology of laissez-faire.  
If we read Hayek or ordoliberals we therefore see an opening for a larger and more active role for the 
state and active polemic against what they perceived as the naive laissez-faire of classical liberalism 
(Bonefeld, 2012; Gamble, 1996; Gray, 1984). In 1944 Hayek states that "Probably nothing has done so 
much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of 
thumb, above all the principle of laissez-faire”. (Hayek 2006, 18)3. Both In Hayek and ordoliberale we 
see what Philip Mirowski call a "market constructivist" position, that is, a notion that the self-
regulating market is not just something naturally existing, but rather an institution that must be 
created through political action. The state's role is not only to step back and let market forces act, but 
rather actively go in and construct the market. 
However, these amounts far from the whole neoliberal spectrum, and especially Milton Friedman 
marked a markedly different attitude towards the state and the classic laissez-faire liberalism (Burgin 
2012). Friedman and Hayek, both prominent members of the Mont Pelerin Society, agreed on the 
essential elements of the neoliberal programme and were for example both centrally involved in the 
development of a far more positive attitude to private monopolies, even in cases where it counteracted 
the free competitive market. This marked a clear breakthrough compared to the adherents of classical 
liberalism, where there, inspired by Adam Smith, generally were a critical stance towards any sort of 
monopoly power; from private companies as well as the state or trade unions (Van Horn 2009). 
On two key issues, however, there were fundamental disagreement between the two. In the 
methodological area Friedman preferred the highly mathematical form of neoclassical economics, 
while Hayek denounced this methodology, in favour his on Austrian school of economics. In the 
political sphere there was disagreement about the relationship to the state and classic laissez-faire 
doctrine. In Capitalism and Freedom Milton Friedman advances a limitation of the state's size and 
rollback of the scope of regulation, and directly describe his work as being “in continuity with 
nineteenth-century liberalism" (Friedman, 1982, 13). Writing in a period where capitalists and 
markets were not as unpopular as in the wake of the great depression, Friedmans very influential 
popularization of neoliberalism, presented in books and newspaper columns from the 1950s to the 
1990s contained a much clearer defence of classical laissez-faire liberalism, than the early neoliberals. 
Although Chicago School contained a variety of theoretical perspectives, it was especially Friedman’s 
neoclassical oriented approach that came to dominate , with a prominent representative in Robert 
                                                             
3 Hayek changed between different denominations throughout his life. At the founding of the Mont Pelerin 
Society, he used neoliberal, but abandoned it later.  In The Constitution of Liberty from 1960 he completely 
renounces the term liberal in favour of "Old Whig." With that he wanted to highlight its commitment to the 
defence of individuality and property, which characterized the English revolution of 1688 or the Scottish 
enlightenment, but also mark the distance to the politically radical turn, he thought liberalism later took  
Lucas, who with his theory of rational expectations tried to delegitimize not only Keynesian 
macroeconomic policy, but any attempt to pursue an active economic policy by the State (Lucas, 1976) 
In order to maintain the thesis of the strong difference between neoliberalism and classical laissez-
faire requires that we assume that Hayek expresses a more real version of neoliberalism than 
Friedman. Whether you describe these differences to the growing power and confidence of the 
neoliberal movement in later decades, or to philosophical differences, it is nevertheless clear that 
Hayeks early work cannot be seen as the unproblematic ideal type for neoliberalism.  
Furthermore, if you look at how neoliberal ideas have had impact in the community over the last 
decades, Friedman's neoclassical approach seems to have had a much greater role than Hayek's 
approach. This is true in economics science, international organizations like the IMF and the World 
Bank and at the national level (Backhouse, 2009; Fine & Milonakis, 2009; Chwieroth, 2009; Ban, 2016; 
Hay, 2004; Stahl & Henriksen, 2014). 
However, while Friedman and his followers have dominated in the theoretical sphere, this has not 
necessarily meant a simple rollback of the state in political practice. Rather the public share of the 
economy has been relatively stable over the period since 1980th. This points towards a situation where 
the understanding of the state of liberal economy cannot be understood as a simple contrast between 
subversive classical liberalism and market constructive and positive state neoliberalism, something 
else must be at play. Philip Mirowski solves this dilemma by putting forward a theory that 
neoliberalism contains a "double truth-doctrine," where it is assumed to have both an exoteric and an 
esoteric version of their ideology. Outwardly the Mt Pelerin Society members preach free markets and 
deregulation, while internally they all understand that it is necessary to use state power to attain these 
goals. A much simpler assumption, however, is that the neoliberal movement contains ideological 
oppositions, and that there is no less reason to take Friedman seriously when he talks about continuity 
with the classical laissez-faire than when Hayek criticizes this view. 
 
4: The utopian element of liberalism 
Jamie Peck argues that neoliberalism have only ever "existed in the 'impure' forms, it can actually exist 
only as messy hybrids. Its utopian vision of a free society and a free economy are ultimately 
unworkable "(Peck 2010, 10). This characteristic seems obviously correct. But, as we have seen, the 
tension between the utopian element and the actually existing political practice is not a unique 
innovation for neoliberalism. It also existed in the classical laissez-faire liberalism. This suggests that 
we are not dealing with a specific question of ideological innovation within the neoliberal movement 
but instead with a general tension between liberal economic ideology and political-economic practices.  
The seedlings of a better understanding of this antagonistic relationship between state and economy 
in liberal economic thinking can be found in Karl Polanyi's work, where the utopian element of liberal 
thinking plays a central role. The goal of Polanyi's magnum opus The Great Transformation (1944) is to 
show the effects of the attempt to realize the “stark utopia” of the self-regulating market. This involved 
the creation of a sphere of production and exchange that  were completely decoupled from the 
coercive state, and governed exclusively the free and equal exchange of goods by independent 
individuals. But at the core of this utopian project lies a paradox - the only feasible way to this utopia 
of self-regulation goes through direct and continuous government intervention4: 
There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have 
come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton 
manufactures - the leading free trade industry - were created by the help of 
protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire 
itself was enforced by the state. The thirties and forties saw not only an outburst 
of legislation repealing restrictive regulations, but also an enormous increase in 
the administrative functions of the state, which was now being endowed with a 
central bureaucracy able to fulfil the tasks set by the adherents of liberalism.  
(Polanyi, 2001, 145). 
 
For Polanyi the attempt to realize the utopia was essentially a Quixotical project.  Ann attempt to 
realize the complete commodification of land, labour and capital, which was necessary for the self-
regulating market mechanism to function, would undermine the very society that market was 
embedded in (Polanyi, 2001, 119). Man cannot stop eating, because the price of basic food items in a 
period increases beyond the scope of their income. Communities and families cannot survive if the 
local farms and factories close or relocate, and men and women a forced to migrate to find work. 
Therefore, these effects attempted mitigated by social reforms, economic regulation and more fixed 
and regulated working conditions. Thus remained the theory of laissez-faire just theories in their 
utopian force could act as both legitimating ideology and draft continued reform of society5. 
The tension between the utopian and practical element of liberal economic thinking that Polanyi 
outlines, points toward a more general difference in the political use of economic ideas. The Canadian 
political scientist Radhika Desai talk about economic ideas may have either directive or legitimizing 
function when they are used politically (Desai, 1994). The directive function is when ideas appear as 
plans or blueprints - ways to reduce complexity in a chaotic world, and opens new avenues for 
political action – such as  Keynesian fiscal policy in the post-war period or monetarism in the 1980s. In 
contrast to this is the legitimizing function is when ideas assume an ideological and, rather than 
blueprints for action acts as an ideological justification of political or economic projects. The success of 
both Classical laissez-faire liberalism and neoliberalism is due to the fact that both  political 
                                                             
4   Polanyi is not the first to point out this paradox. In Prison Notebooks from 1932-34 Antonio Gramsci points 
out that “it must be made clear that laissez-faire too is a form of State “regulation”, introduced and maintained by 
legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, 
automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, laissez-faire liberalism is a political programme” 
(Gramsci, 1991) 273)   
5 In the colonies and peripherals countries the experiment with the self-regulating market were  allowed to run 
much longer than in the core countries and with consequences that were even more destructive than what 
Polanyi drew up. In Ireland in the 1840s and India in the last half of the 19th century, the full commodification of 
food production was allowed to run out of their logical conclusion, and millions starved to death when drought 
or plant diseases drove their incomes below subsistence level (O Grada, 1993; Davis, 2002; Stahl, 2016). 
movements contained both these aspects. Both a market utopian element that described the 
possibility of society based on individualized voluntary exchange, freed from state and collective 
coercion, as well as a practical openness for using the institutional means of power made available by 
the modern state, to realize this project. 
 
 
5: Conclusion: What remains of neoliberalism? 
In recent years we have seen a number of researchers, with Mirowski and Peck as prominent 
examples, develop a much more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in neoliberal thinking. 
This has helped break down the simplistic contrast between state and market that has characterized 
much economic discussion, by demonstrating how the state in neoliberal theory and practice just been 
used to expand market regulation in society. This realization is unfortunately often highlighted by 
contrasting neoliberalism with a caricatured version of the classic laissez-faire liberalism, which is 
portrayed as a naive rejection of government intervention. Inspired by Polanyi's analysis, this article 
have tried to show that this is not the case. If we look at the classical laissez-faire liberalism in the 
nineteenth century, a far more nuanced picture appears. We see a much greater openness to the use of 
state power to actively construct new markets, both in terms of theory and political practice, than 
portrayed in the simplistic picture. At the same time, we also see differences within the neoliberal 
movement, and especially Friedman and his followers in the Chicago school are relatively close to the 
classical laissez-faire tradition. Thus it seems that the tension filled love-hate relationship to the state 
is not a specific feature of the neoliberal movement, but rather a general tension within liberal 
economic thinking. This continuity has led some to completely refrain from  suing the term 
neoliberalism. Andrew Gamble, one of the leading English readers of Hayek, for example, speaks of 
economic libertarianism (Gamble, 2013), while the economist John Quiggin talking about market 
liberalism (Quiggin, 2010). 
By giving up the term neoliberalism however, one loses sight of the fact that the form of liberal 
ideological hegemony we see today is historically distinct and shaped by specific institutional and 
ideological conditions. Even though neoliberalism has reinvented, and thus inherited, the dilemmas 
from the classical liberal period, it is a distinct intellectual formation, which can be traced to the Mt 
Pelerin Society. This was not only well-organized movement among intellectuals and wealthy patrons 
spreading known ideas. You can see distinct theoretical innovations from the network, such as the 
development of a much more positive view of large companies and their monopoly power. 
Simultaneously, as neoliberalism was formulated in a period of increasing macroeconomic activism by 
the state and a strong labour movement, much of the neoliberal project was focusing on criticising and 
overcoming Keynesian economic and the welfare state.   
In short, it is possible point to a number of significant differences between neoliberalism and the 
classical liberalism. But it is a fiction that we see a distinct divide between a naïve, laissez-faire 
liberalism classical and a state-positive neoliberalism. What we see is is rather a new phase in a much 
larger and longer conversation about the relationship between state and market in a liberal economy. 
Here we see a constant tension within the liberal economic thinking between a desire to limit the state 
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